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Massachusetts Supreme Court introduced a novel argument in support of state bans on same-sex
marriage: that marriage is an institution designed to create a safe social and legal space for accidental
heterosexual reproduction, a space that is not necessary for same-sex couples who, by definition,
cannot accidentally reproduce. Since 2003, every state appellate court considering a same-sex
marriage case has adopted Justice Cordy's dissent until the recent California Supreme Court decision
In Re Marriage Cases. In case after case, courts have held that marriage allows states to send a
message to potentially irresponsible procreators that "marriage is a (normatively) necessary part of
their procreative endeavor" and that same-sex couples do not need marriage because they only
procreate after considerable effort and forethought. This article examines the accidental procreation
argument through the lenses of anthropological theory, history, literature, and constitutional law. We
conclude that marriage has sometimes been used to channel male heterosexuality into reproduction,
but to argue that this goal is the sine qua non of marriage is to vastly oversimplify its history in both
law and culture. We then undertake a genealogy of the accidental procreation argument and speculate
about its possible effects on the institution of marriage. We suggest that if courts continue to insist
upon a definition of marriage that is so distinct from the actual practice of the institution, the law may
actually be less and less influential in regulating intimate behavior.
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INTRODUCTION
The more American courts, and the American people, weigh in on
same-sex marriage, the more problematic the very concept of "marriage"
becomes. On May 15, 2008, in In re Marriage Cases, the California
Supreme Court declared that California's ban on same-sex marriage
violated the California constitution.1 The presidential election of 2008,
however, provided the occasion for a well-funded California ballot
initiative, Proposition 8, which claimed to amend the California
constitution and thereby reverse the state Supreme Court decision.2 The
18,000 same-sex couples married between the decision of the California
Supreme Court and the passage of Proposition 8 currently occupy a legal
limbo that points to the curious status of marriage itself: an institution and
an existential condition experienced over the centuries by vast numbers of
people from cultures around the globe, and the subject of much discourse,
ritual, and legal process, yet strangely resistant to definition.3  The
movement for same-sex marriage has so far had only limited success, but
it has had the effect of eliciting attempts to define, and legislate, the nature
of marriage, most notably from those who insist that it is the union of one
man and one woman, making the question of what constitutes "marriage"
more ambiguous than ever.
Despite its contested status, In re Marriage Cases remains important
because of the reasoning advanced by the court's majority: it is one of
only three decisions to reject the argument that states may rationally
restrict marriage to straight couples because gay people are too responsible
to need it. Unlike heterosexual couples, state court after state court has
argued, same-sex couples cannot accidentally procreate (at least not
together), and the institution of marriage was designed to create a social
safeguard for accidental procreation. As the California Supreme Court
elaborated when rejecting this argument:
1. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 402 (Cal. 2008). In October, the Connecticut Supreme
Court followed suit, in Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Health, 289 Conn. 135 (Conn. 2008).
2. The status of Proposition 8 is itself in doubt as we write: is it an amendment to the California
Constitution, or does it represent a revision of such substance in basic rights that the change would
need ratification by a two-thirds majority of the legislature? See Editorial. California's Legal Tangle,
N.Y. TIMES, November 25, 2008 at A30. The California Supreme Court has agreed to hear three cases
offering legal challenges to Proposition 8: Strauss v. Horton, Tyler v. Slate of California, and City and
County of San Francisco v. Horton. Oral argument took place on March 5, 2009, and the Court must
reach a decision within 90 days of oral argument. See Supreme Court of California, Oral Argument
Calendar, San Francisco Session. March 3, 4, and 5, 2009, available at
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/courts/calendars/documents/SMARAO9.PDF (last accessed Feb. 16,
2009); Judicial Council of California, Administrative Office of the Courts, News Release No. 8:
Supreme Court to Hear Oral Arguments in Prop. 8 Cases on March 5, 2009 (Feb. 3, 2009), available
at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/presscenter/newsreleases/NR08-09.PDF (last accessed Feb. 16, 2009).
3. On the 18,000 same-sex couples, see Jesse McKinley, Top Lawyer Urges Voiding California
Proposition 8, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2008 at A 1l.
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These decisions have explained that although same-sex couples can
have or obtain children through assisted reproduction or adoption,
resort to such methods demonstrates, in the case of a same-sex
couple, that parenthood necessarily is an intended consequence
because each of these two methods requires considerable planning
and expense, whereas in the case of an opposite-sex couple a child
often is the unintended consequence of the couple's sexual
intercourse. These courts reason that a state plausibly could conclude
that although affording the benefits of marriage to opposite-sex
couples is an incentive needed to ensure that accidental procreation is
channeled into a stable family relationship, a similar incentive is not
required for same-sex couples because they cannot produce children
accidentally.4
In other words, in order to have children, same-sex couples must do so
not unadvisedly or lightly, but deliberately, reverently, and often at great
financial cost. The rationale adopted by these courts, which essentially
pays a back-handed compliment to gay and lesbian couples by deeming
them too responsible for marriage, is a relatively new one, and a dramatic
shift from the rhetoric that appeared just a few years ago in opinions
concerning same-sex marriage (and has continued to appear in a watered-
down version along side the new rhetoric of accidental procreation). Gay
people, these previous opinions held, were excluded from marriage
because they could not procreate, not because they procreated more
responsibly than straight folks. If they did have children, through
adoption or artificial reproductive technologies or turkey basters or old-
fashioned heterosexual intercourse with someone external to the couple,
then courts worried about their ability to parent-perhaps they wouldn't
teach their children appropriate gender roles, or perhaps they would
"recruit" their children into a dissolute life, or perhaps having more than
two parents would be confusing for the child-but courts were certainly
not saying that same-sex couples made superior parents.
This all changed in 2003, with a dissenting opinion in Goodridge v.
Department of Public Health authored by Justice Robert Cordy of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.5  Justice Cordy's dissenting
opinion presented marriage as a necessary channeling of male sexuality to
useful and policed reproduction. For Justice Cordy, marriage is an
institution designed to create a safe social and legal space for accidental
heterosexual reproduction, a space that is not necessary for same-sex
couples who, by definition, cannot accidentally reproduce.6 Following the
publication of Goodridge, Cordy's rationale was taken up by the majority
in every other state supreme court (saving the California court in In re
4. In re Marriage Cases at 431 (emphasis in original).
5. Goodridge v. Department of Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003),
6. Id. at 995.
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Marriage Cases and Connecticut in Kerrigan), and many state district and
appellate courts, that heard a same-sex marriage case.' Without marriage,
these opinions suggest, heterosexual people would labor under the
misimpression that reproduction is acceptable without a long-term
commitment to parenting. By limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples-
people who might accidentally reproduce through their sexual relations-
the state can send a message that marriage is the proper space for
reproduction and constrain an unwieldy and dangerous male
(hetero)sexuality that would otherwise cause social chaos.
Courts have long struggled to define marriage. Is it a status or a
contract? A public means of allocating wealth and providing for the social
welfare, or a private agreement between two intimates? But never before
have courts so truncated the possible purposes of marriage to assign it one
goal: here, the policing of accidental procreation. The enthusiasm with
which other state supreme courts have adopted Justice Cordy's rationale
made us curious about its origins and logic. This article considers the
issue through a variety of lenses-anthropological theory, history,
literature, and constitutional law-to test the idea that marriage's sine qua
non is the policing of accidental procreation. We conclude that marriage
has meant many very different things at different times, but never has it
been solely-or even primarily-a protection against accidental
reproduction by heterosexuals. Except in very limited circumstances, the
primary purpose of marriage was not to constrain men's sexuality, but
rather to allocate women among men, and to ensure the legitimacy of
children whom men wanted to be considered legitimate.
Toward the end of his Goodridge dissent, Justice Cordy asserted that by
limiting marriage to "opposite-sex couples who can at least theoretically
procreate, society is able to communicate a consistent message to its
citizens that marriage is a (normatively) necessary part of their procreative
endeavor ... If society proceeds similarly to recognize marriages between
same-sex couples who cannot procreate, it could be perceived as an
abandonment of this claim, and might result in the mistaken view that civil
marriage has little to do with procreation."8 The argument reminds us a
bit of a 1960s bumper sticker: "Love safely, too many people are caused
by accidents." Ultimately, Justice Cordy, and those who espouse his
views, see marriage as a message. In his view, it is of course a message of
necessary socio-sexual discipline, the exercise of the state's repressive
7. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006); Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E. 2d
15, 24-26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 981 (Wash. 2006); Stanhardt
v. Superior Court ex rel. County. of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. 2003); Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d
571 (Md. 2007); Lewis v. Harris, 188 N.J. 415, 458 (2005). Another case, Vamum v. Brien, has yet to
produce a written opinion. Oral argument occurred in Varnum before the Iowa Supreme Court on
December 9, 2008. See http://www.judiciaLstate.ia.us/Supreme_.Court/Varnum-v_Brien/Oral
_ArgumentLive Stream/ (last accessed Feb. 16 2009).
8. Goodridge, 798 N.E. 2d at 1002.
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power over a potentially anarchic sexuality. But if that is the message, it
clearly has many discontents-it has had them for centuries-and leaves
many readers wanting to read an alternative text. We conclude that
limiting the purpose of marriage to this singular goal may actually result in
exactly the opposite of what Justice Cordy and others intend. The more
courts insist on a reproductive definition of marriage, the more the
marriage message will end up in the "dead letter office."
We wish in this article to reflect on those definitions: the ways in which
they characterize marriage, their apparent cultural contexts, and the
messages they seem to send. To this end, we will draw on diverse
materials: legal, literary, historical and anthropological sources. For
marriage is by no means exclusively the province of the law-in fact,
where marriage is concerned one could probably say that culture was there
before the law. Or perhaps more accurately: marriage needs to be thought
of as one of the first steps toward the creation of law, one of the first
instances of societal rules. To the extent that marriage as cultural artifact
intertwines with, and even possibly trumps marriage as a legal concept,
the recourse to "law and humanities"-and more broadly, law and the
cultural imaginary-seems a necessity. It is an example of an area where
law not only would profit from interaction with culture, but really cannot
intelligently do without such interaction. To claim to know what marriage
is in an exclusively legal context misses the point, and those who would
use marriage to send social and cultural messages by no means confine
themselves to the law - so neither do we.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I gives a snapshot of the
multifarious and shifting cultural meanings that marriage has embodied,
and considers the accidental procreation rationale in light of these
meanings. This Part concludes that disciplining male sexuality and
reproductive capacity has sometimes been a goal of marriage, but that
marriage as an institution has been much richer and more complex than
the "accidental procreationists" claim. Part II examines the constitutional
jurisprudence of marriage: what have courts, especially the United States
Supreme Court, said about the nature of marriage before the onset of the
current same-sex marriage debate, and how closely did the Court link
marriage to procreation in defining substantive due process rights for
each? This Part concludes that although marriage as discussed by the
Court has always been related to procreation, the new argument that the
purpose of marriage is solely to facilitate responsible procreation vastly
oversimplifies the history of marriage and the Court's previous
jurisprudence. Part III undertakes a genealogy of recent same-sex
marriage cases, tracing the shifting rationales that eventually spawned the
accidental procreation rationale of Justice Cordy's dissent. Finally, Part
IV concludes with thoughts about the importance of the accidental
procreation argument for marriage. We suggest that if courts continue to
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insist upon a definition of marriage that is so distinct from the actual
practice of the institution, the law may actually be less and less influential
in regulating intimate behavior.
I. MARRIAGE IN CULTURE
It is not easy to say what is common to the different forms that have
characterized the practice and institution of marriage-to find what is of
essence in marriage-and its histories often suggest contrary meanings of
the institution. What marriage is remains a cipher. As Lawrence Rosen
has noted, it is impossible "[t]o take ... an individual example of marital
arrangements or familial forms and use it to prove (or disprove) a
universal proposition about all marriages or all families."9  Our
undertaking here is much more modest: we explore some of the shifting
meanings of marriage merely to show that Justice Cordy's definition
somewhat arbitrarily pulls from some strands of the history of marriage
while ignoring other, far more common and important goals. Marriage
has sometimes functioned as a check on (male) (hetero)sexual impulses,
but it has also functioned in many other ways. We undertake this
admittedly oversimplified retelling of the history of marriage both to
demonstrate what a difficult job it is for a judge to say what marriage "is"
and also to demonstrate how contradictory, confused, and just plain messy
the institution is.
The accidental procreation argument has three strands that deserve
scrutiny from an anthropological and historical perspective: the claim that
the state may have "created" the institution of marriage, the claim that the
reason behind the creation of marriage was the prevention of accidental
procreation, and the claim that accidental procreation is bad because it
harms children. All three claims make little sense when we examine the
institution of marriage, either cross-culturally or in the western legal
tradition.
The claim that states "created" marriage in order to deal with accidental
procreation is either overtly or tacitly endorsed in the judicial opinions
using the accidental procreation rationale. Some courts have actually
claimed that the state created opposite-sex marriage, complete with all of
the legal benefits of marriage, "to discourage unplanned, out-of-wedlock
births resulting from casual intercourse."10 Others have implied as much
with more subtlety. Justice Cordy's Goodridge dissent, for example,
states: "[A]n orderly society requires some mechanism for coping with the
fact that sexual intercourse [between a man and a woman] commonly
results in pregnancy and childbirth. The institution of marriage is that
9. Lawrence Rosen, Anthropological Perspectives on the Abolition of Marriage, in MARRIAGE
PROPOSALS: QUESTIONING A LEGAL STATUS (Anita Bernstein ed., 2006) 161-62.
10. Morrison, 821 N.E. 2dat 24.
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mechanism."" l Both opinions miss what most anthropologists take as a
given: that marriage is not the result of legal action by the state, but
actually predates the state. As Justice Douglas admitted in Griswold v.
Connecticut, marriage is "older than the Bill of Rights"; 12 indeed, it is
older than law itself. Marriage created the state by ordering society in a
way that leads to the rule of law, not because it was imposed by law. Or,
one might say, marriage is one of the first instances of "the law,"
conceived as a culture's rules for conduct and survival.
Perhaps the most famous modem anthropologist, and the person most
commonly credited with explaining the near-universal existence of
organized kinship relationships across cultures is the French structuralist
Claude Lvi-Strauss. Lvi-Strauss argued that marriage had nothing to do
with the regulation of sexuality or procreation but rather with the creation
of alliances among different kinship groups-alliances that created
complex patterns of relationship that dictated whom one could, and
especially whom one could not, marry.13 Marriage came into being not
because men and women had sexual intercourse that resulted in children
(they had already been doing this successfully for millennia) but because
unless small kinship groups attempted to reach out to other groups,
creating tribes (and ultimately nations), they were vulnerable to attack and
extinction.14 As Lvi-Strauss famously put it, humans in society must
"marry out or be killed."15 To the extent that marriage involves sex and
procreation, then, it is not to contain the procreative impulse, or to channel
sexual activity into certain relationships, but rather to use one's offspring
as a means of alliance building and self-protection-a very different goal,
indeed. It is marriage that makes us civilized human beings, not because it
chastens us sexually, but because it creates alliances between families that
in turn create communities, governments, and organizations of
membership and belonging. For Lvi-Strauss, this need for exogamy is
the reason behind the incest taboos that seem to exist in almost all
cultures. Sex and procreation with members of one's own family prevents
a person from using sex and procreation as tools of alliance building-
prevents the development of culture, law, the state.
Not every modem anthropologist agrees with the details of Lrvi-
Strauss's theory, but most would agree that human beings created kinship
structures before they were organized into states or governments, and that
these kinship structures played an important role in the development of
cultures and law. The legal fiction that the state "created" the benefits of
marriage in order to induce wayward straight people into responsible
11. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 995.
12. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
13. CLAUDE LtvI-STRAUSS, THE VIEW FROM AFAR 17 (Basic Books 1985).
14. Id.
15. Id., citing Edward Burnett Tylor.
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procreation is a bit of an anachronism. It would make more sense to say
that kinship relationships were one of the first-perhaps the first-way in
which people organized themselves into what eventually became
governments.
So if the state did not "create" marriage, could there nevertheless be
something to the idea that the reason marriage developed was to prevent
accidental procreation? Here, too, the bulk of the historical record points
in another direction. Levi-Strauss argued that the role played by women
in marriage was that of gift-and the most precious of gifts, at that,
because only women (and not animals or objects) could create the
alliances that would result in the mixing of the blood of kinship groups.16
In feminist theorist Gayle Rubin's gloss on Levi-Strauss, marriage is
responsible both for compulsory heterosexuality (women must be
available to be given as gifts) and for gendered division of labor (women
and men must be interdependent on each other so that they will perceive a
need to marry and perpetuate the system). 7 Thus the sexuality most
constrained by marriage is female sexuality, and it should come as no
surprise that many cultures punish female sexual transgression more
harshly than similar misbehavior by men. Marriage, far from chastening
male sexuality, was a way of enabling men to exchange women for sexual
and reproductive use.
It is one thing to say that marriage has provided a way for men to
engage in the orderly exchange of women in traditional cultures, but this
does not tell us anything about marriage's function in western legal
thought. But a close look at the development of marriage law in the West
shows that, if anything, with the emergence of modern societies and the
modem legal system, the subordination of women in marriage became
more visible. Upon reflection this is hardly surprising: a system that takes
private property very seriously will likely take the ownership of women
and children seriously as well, and marriage has been an exemplary
facilitator of this kind of ownership.
During the time in which American marriage was being shaped, women
in marriage not only were not equal to men but essentially lost their
independence and their very identity through coverture. Coverture as a
legal matter reflects the objectification of women through marriage: under
coverture a married woman lost her legal identity, which became
subsumed with the identity of her husband.' 8 One might say that she
became the property of her husband; indeed, the law of "domestic
relations" at common law included the law of husband and wife, father
16. Gayle Rubin, The Traffic in Women: Notes on the Political Economy of Sex, in TOWARD AN
ANTHROPOLOGY OF WOMEN 173 (Rayna Reiter ed., Monthly Review Press 1975).
17. Id. at 180.
18. See I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 442.
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and child, and master and servant, all hierarchical status relationships in
which one half of the dyad performed some degree of authority and
control over the other.' 9 The history of marriage, in legal cases and in
imaginative literature from Madame Bovary to Anna Karenina to
Middlemarch, largely displays women as oppressed, exploited, abused,
and suffocated by marriage. Men may also have felt constricted by its
bonds, but they have traditionally been freer to participate in marriage (or
not) to their advantage.
In the English legal tradition, the exchange of women through marriage
served not only the function of creating alliances for purposes of survival
but also for maintaining control over private property. Marriage can be
seen as an efficient method of determining which children would become
heirs, and would therefore be legally entitled to inherit property. Children
born outside marriage-bastards-were not able to inherit, although their
fathers in some circumstances might provide for them."0 That the wife in
this particular legal system was a "gift" in the Lvi-Straussian sense can
be seen from the property law consequences to her of marriage-her
husband became responsible for any property she brought to the marriage,
and in fact could make use of rents from lands owned by her in any way
he wished. He was responsible to leave her in the event of his death with
a life estate in one third of his property ("dower"), presumably not to
compensate her for any income lost because of marriage but to ensure that
she was adequately provided for.21 Marriage provided not only a way to
transmit wealth inter-generationally but more specifically a way for men
to determine how to transmit wealth independent of accidental
22procreation. Men could procreate, whether intentionally or accidentally,
and widely, but it was only those children born within marriage or those
children a man chose to legitimate who could become heirs. Marriage
thus functioned not as a check on the wildness of male heterosexuality but
as a way for men to maintain sexual freedom without adverse financial
consequences to themselves or their (official) families.23
19. See, e.g., JAMES SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS;
EMBRACING HUSBAND AND WIFE, PARENT AND CHILD, GUARDIAN AND WARD, INFANCY, AND
MASTER AND SERVANT (2d ed., Little, Brown 1874).
20. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at 458-59.
21. See id. at 445; Charles Donahue, Jr., What Causes Fundamental Legal Ideas? Marital
Property in England and France in the Thirteenth Century, 78 MICH. L. REV. 59, 65 (1979).
22. Indeed, one historian found that one out of every three women who gave birth in an English
town between 1270 and 1348 did so outside of marriage. G.C. Homans, English Villagers of the
Thirteenth Century (1942), cited in STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY 112 (2005).
According to Coontz, richer peasants tended to avoid bearing children out of wedlock because they
had more to lose in inheritance disputes. Id. at 113.
23. Thus, in the opening line of Jane Austen's Pride and Prejudice we are told "It is a truth
universally acknowledged that a single man in possession of a good fortune, must be in want of a
wife." Why does he need a wife? To have legitimate children to inherit that large fortune. The tone
of Austin's opening may be worldly irony, but the idea expressed is nonetheless held to be true.
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Marriage's disproportionately disciplining effect on women can also be
detected in the law of adultery. Until the last 200 years (or so), adultery in
much of the western world was the crime of having intercourse with a
married woman.24 Sex between an unmarried woman and a married man
did not qualify, as sex with a married man would not pollute his family's
blood lines and would not result in the attendant disruption of the
transmittal of property from one generation to the other. Sex with a
married woman, on the other hand, might result in a child who was
unrelated to her husband becoming that husband's legal heir.25 The sexual
activity being channeled by marriage here is that of the married woman
and her potential sexual partners, not the married man. Married men
appear to have frequently visited brothels, harbored mistresses, and
engaged in extensive extra-marital activity with little social or legal
consequence.
Historians have observed a marked difference in the cultural purpose of
marriage in the past two centuries: the rise of companionate marriage, in
which spouses are expected to satisfy each others' emotional needs. This
is a highly personal, individualistic view of marriage where the couple's
personal desires take precedence over the needs of the individuals' fathers
to control their property, their extended families to create alliances, or the
community's need to discipline sexuality. These historians describe the
twentieth century family as an "encounter group, ' '26 or a private sphere
where couples can "express creatively ... individuality ... shared
identity, and.., changing commitments.., love."27  This most recent
version of family life puts particular pressure on marriage to be fulfilling.
As John Demos puts it, "[m]onogamous marriage is liable to become
boring and stultifying; in other things, after all, variety is 'the spice of
life' . .. 'spice' and 'space': these are, in fact, the qualities for which we
yearn most especially. And the family severely limits our access to either
one."28 Lawrence Friedman is careful to insist that this emphasis on the
individual does not mean that the family has declined, fallen, or dissolved.
24. See Marvin M. Moore, The Diverse Definitions of Criminal Adultery, 30 U. KAN. CITY L.
REV. 219 (1962) (stating that the Puritans used the Biblical definition of adultery as sex with another's
wife (Leviticus 20:10 and Deuteronomy 22:22), but after the revolutionary war, most states adopted the
canon law definition, where wives and husbands could be guilty of adultery); see also ROLLIN M.
PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 329 (1957) (noting that English common law defined adultery as illicit
intercourse with a married woman); JOHN D'EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS:
A HISTORY OF SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 5 (1997, 2d Ed.) (during the Puritan era, "church and society
dealt more harshly with women who engaged in pre- or extramarital sexuality than with male
transgressors, for female chastity and fidelity assured men of the legitimacy of their children").
25. See Moore, supra note 24, at 219-20, 227 (explaining English common law rule as justified
because "if the female party to illicit intercourse was married this might tend to introduce spurious
offspring into the home, but this could not result if the only married party was a man").
26. JOHN DEMOS, PAST, PRESENT, AND PERSONAL: THE FAMILY AND THE LIFE COURSE IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 58 (1986).
27. HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 312 (2000).
28. DEMOS, supra note 26, at 58.
[21:1
Abrams & Brooks
Rather, it has "changed and broadened.., become more elastic.- 29
Certainly it has become less tethered to procreation and more bound up in
fulfillment.
Michel Foucault has suggested another way of thinking about the shift
from community-oriented marriage to individualistic marriage.
Aristocratic marriage in traditional societies assured purity of descent, of
the patrilineal bloodline: the antiquity and the glory of alliances created,
the clear tracing of inheritance rights defined one's identity. The advent
of the bourgeoisie in modem times tends to increase the importance of
sexuality in marriage: instead of the bloodline, what counts is the
projection of self, family, and property into the future, through one's
descendants: sperm rather than blood. Marriage becomes the guarantee of
future descendants, of a kind of symbolic immortality through the passing
on of one's genetic material, and one's cultural identity. Hence the
emphasis on bodily health, on the protection of sperm (no masturbation),
and the anxiety of venereal disease as seen in its hereditary consequences
(a theme, not surprisingly, in a number of nineteenth-century novels).3°
So does the idea of marriage as an institution that channels men's
sexuality ever erupt in the western tradition? Yes, in the history of the
Catholic Church and its offshoots. Beginning with the Apostle Paul, we
see the rise of the idea that sexuality is dangerous and best cabined by an
institution designed to contain it ("is it better to marry than to bum").3
The rise of marriage in pre-modem Europe seems to have been driven by
the Church's desire to see the European peasantry clean up its act, and to
get sexuality under the yoke of marriage.3 2 The introductory words of the
wedding liturgy of the Anglican Church, for example, stated: "One cause
[of God's institution of marriage] was the procreacion of children, to be
brought up in the feare and nurture of the Lord, and prayse of God.
Secondly it was ordeined for a remedie agaynst sinne, and to avoide
fornicacion, that suche persones as bee maried, might live chastlie in
matrimonie, and kepe themselves undefiled membres of Christes bodye."33
But note that here marriage is first of all seen as the fostering rather than
29. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, PRIVATE LIVES: INDIVIDUALS, FAMILIES, AND THE LAW 11 (2004).
30. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, vo1. 1 (1978). For a striking example
of a child undone by a syphilitic inheritance, see the figure of Jacques de Mortsauf in HONORt DE
BALZAC, LE LYS DANS LA VALL'EE [THE LILY OF THE VALLEY] (1836); and toward the end of the
nineteenth century, there is a proliferation of such figures.
31. 1 Corinthians 7:9.
32. See in particular canons concerning marriage from the Fourth Latran Council, convoked by
Pope Innocent III in 1215; see also THE CANONS AND DECREES OF THE SACRED AND OECUMENICAL
COUNCIL OF TRENT 194 (J. Waterworth ed. and trans., Dolman Press 1848) (available at
http://history.hanover.edu/texts/trent/ct24.html) (documenting Church's decision to declare marriage a
sacrament at the Council of Trent in 1545-47).
33. THOMAS CRANMER, BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER (1549), available at
http://justus.anglican.org/resourcesfbcp/1549/Marriage1549.htm (repeated in every revision until
1789 in the U.S.).
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the policing of procreation (and this seems to be true in most religious
marriage ceremonies still today), and then as a preservative against extra-
marital fornication, which has been defined as sin. This of course touches
on a long history of Christian unease with sexuality and the body that has
been well expounded by Elaine Pagels.34 Justice Cordy's social safeguard
argument offers a secularized and utilitarian version of"chastlie" living.
Marriage, then, came before law. Marriage functioned to create
alliances, distribute women among men, and maintain lines of property
and inheritance. And in some traditions, the Christian tradition being the
dominant one, it has functioned to tame heterosexuality. All of these
functions were about both the individual and the group, the place of a
person within a kinship system, a wealth system, and a society at large.
Today, as we have seen, marriage is increasingly focused on the individual
(or the couple) rather than the group. And to the extent that marriage was
about protecting women and children from rampant male heterosexuality
(and as we have seen, this was only one piece of a complex institution),
the de-linking of sex and procreation and the de-linking of marriage from
responsibility for procreation has decreased the need for marriage as a
disciplining institution. Three developments in particular have had a
major impact on why we are now able to think about marriage as an
individual act of personal fulfillment: effective contraception, legal
abortion, and child support statutes. Despite the myriad problems with
enforcement of child support statutes, they still provide a method of
regulating male reproductive sexuality much more broadly than marriage
ever could. Whereas marriage put men in the driver's seat, allowing them
to determine which children they fathered would be legal children, the
presumption behind child support statutes is that any child fathered by a
particular man has a financial claim for support from that man, regardless
of the father's intention at the time of conception.35 Access to abortion
and contraception have further decreased the need for a disciplining
institution, at least for those people who are willing to use them; it is no
longer self-evident that the only result of heterosexual intercourse will be
procreation.
There remains the third claim of the accidental procreation argument:
that the purpose of marriage, ultimately, is to protect children by providing
them with a family. Cross-culturally, this is both true and false. Every
culture has some sort of kinship system, and one function of these kinship
systems is to allocate the responsibility for children to certain people. But
the idea that this responsibility should be taken by heterosexual, nuclear
families is a product primarily of the last few hundred years, and mostly
34. ELAINE PAGELS, ADAM, EvE, AND THE SERPENT (1988).
35. Ira Mark ElIman, Thinking about Custody and Support in Ambiguous-Father Families, 36
FAM. L.Q. 49, 70-7 1.
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the twentieth century. The history of the family includes a wide variety of
structures, most often including extended families and polygamous
families, where care of children is shared by many. In an important sense,
the idea that marriage is necessary to channel men into being good fathers
gives men not enough and too much credit. Men have always supported
children, including children who are not their own but the children of
relatives or the children of their wives' other sexual partners. On the other
hand, men have not usually been the primary caretakers of children.
Indeed, the understanding of children as fragile, emotional selves in
need of extensive parenting and nurturance is the most modem of all of
the views we have so far discussed. Contemporary discourses about the
importance of two-parent families so that children can become acquainted
with representatives of different gender roles would be incomprehensible
to a pre-nineteenth-century ear, when children were thought of not as
individuals with a special moral claim to nurturance but the property of
their fathers to be used for labor as needed-and sometimes even hired out
as laborers to other families.36 So too would the idea of "accidental
procreation" have been an anomaly: in an era of high infant mortality, it
was the accidental death of infants and children that struck fear into the
heart of parents and the broader community alike.37 And in an era before
reliable contraception, what exactly were the "unintended consequences"
of sexual intercourse? People knew that women often found themselves
pregnant, and many women, no doubt fully comprehending the threat to
their very lives that repeated pregnancies and childbirth posed, tried to
prevent pregnancy, but without reliable birth control, procreation was the
norm, not the exception. Unwanted procreation, perhaps, but hardly
accidental.
This broad-brushed summary, while vastly oversimplified, should make
clear that marriage has been an enormously varied, internally inconsistent,
and even mysterious institution. It developed before law, but was shaped
by both legal and religious forces. It has been linked culturally to
procreation throughout the ages, but in ways far different from what the
accidental procreation rationale would suggest. It has shifted in the last
two centuries from being fundamentally concerned with community and
the individual's role within the community to being concerned with the
individual's self-actualization through the creation of family ties. And
marriage has almost always policed women's sexuality and reproductive
36. Janet L. Dolgin, Suffer the Children: Nostalgia, Contradiction and the New Reproductive
Technologies, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 473, 484 (1996). Indeed, tort law gave parents a cause of action for
the loss of their child's services in the event of the child's injury. See SCHOULER, supra note 19, at
351.
37. See D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 24, at 5, 26 (high infant and child mortality rates in
the American colonies "encouraged frequent pregnancies in order to produce living heirs"; colonist
women used folk remedies and fertility medicines "to encourage conception and avoid miscarriage
rather than to avoid pregnancy").
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capacity more than it has men's, and did so, at least in Western legal
culture, in a world in which women and children were treated as property.
Although there are strands in the history of marriage supportive of Justice
Cordy's idea of marriage as a disciplinary institution, these strands are
only one piece of a much larger puzzle, a puzzle courts may be ill-
equipped to solve.
II. MARRIAGE IN LAW
Most state court cases upholding same-sex marriage bans have cited to
the United States Supreme Court for the proposition that marriage and
procreation are linked,38 and indeed, as in culture, marriage in United
States constitutional law has been linked to procreation. But a close
reading of the leading Supreme Court cases on marriage reveals that the
Court has had a much richer, more nuanced, and, some might argue, more
confused, notion of the purpose of marriage than that it is a mechanism for
channeling male sexuality and accidental procreation. The Court has
consistently conceived of marriage as having myriad functions, as diverse
as efficiently determining property rights, ensuring "proper" division of
labor and sex roles for men and women, providing a stable foundation for
and microcosmic example of constitutional democracy, creating a legal
space for sexual activity, and holding oneself out as emotionally and
publicly tied to another. The accidental procreation rationale is nowhere
to be seen, and even where variations on it might be glimpsed (through,
for example, the argument that marriage for most elevates the morality of
all), it has never been the only basis for marriage. Instead, the Court has
struggled to define the meaning of an institution whose existence it has
taken for granted.
The earliest Supreme Court cases concerning marriage were not about
the right to enter into the institution but rather about how marriage
affected other rights; these cases nevertheless required the Court to say
something about what marriage is (or was). In Maynard v. Hill, for
example, the Court proclaimed that "Marriage, as creating the most
important relation in life, as having more to do with the morals and
civilization of a people than any other institution, has always been subject
to the control of the legislature." 39 Somewhat ironically, the import of this
"moral relation" was that the legislature could grant a unilateral legislative
divorce to a husband without his wife's notice or consent, divesting the
wife of property rights she was entitled to only if married.4" Similarly, in
38. See Conaway, 932 A.2d at 630; Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 462; Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at 33;
Andersen, 138 P.3d at 978.
39. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
40. Id. at 214-16 (holding that property fights under Donation Act did not vest until husband had
worked property for four years, and since he divorced his wife before four years had expired, she had
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Bradwell v. Illinois, marriage functioned as the Court's excuse for refusing
to require the State of Illinois to allow a woman to practice law: because a
married woman had "no legal existence separate from her husband," a
married woman could not enter into contracts, and therefore could not
have an independent career. Unmarried women were described by Justice
Bradley as "exceptions to the general rule" and therefore also excludable
from legal practice. Presumably this rule would encourage women to
engage in their "paramount destiny and mission to fulfil the noble and
benign offices of wife and mother."'" In Reynolds v. United States, a case
upholding a criminal ban on polygamy, the Court used the occasion to
make a claim about the value of monogamous marriage to society,
famously stating that "Upon it society may be said to be built, and out of
its fruits spring social relations and social obligations and duties," and
connecting the form of marriage-monogamous or polygamous-with
attendant forms of government, whereby monogamy leads to democracy,
and polygamy "to the patriarchal principle, and... fetters the people in
stationary despotism.42 In each of these cases, the Court recognized that
there was something important and fundamental about marriage, but could
not articulate exactly what that fundamental thing was.
It was not until the early twentieth century that the Supreme Court
began to explicitly link marriage and procreation. Early substantive due
process cases concerned procreative and parenting rights, not marriage
rights, but these cases invoked marriage as a right analogous to procreative
rights in that it was personal and fundamental. In Skinner v. Oklahoma,
the Court struck down a statute allowing involuntary sterilization by
characterizing the issue as involving "one of the basic civil rights of man"
and linking the right to marriage: "Marriage and procreation are
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race." " Similarly,
in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, a case about parents' constitutional liberty
interest in directing the upbringing and education of their children,44 and
Meyer v. Nebraska, in which the Court upheld the right of parents to allow
their children to learn German,45 the Court linked marriage and
procreation as rights essential to the pursuit of happiness.
Marriage and procreation were once again coupled by the Court in
Griswold v. Connecticut, a case about the constitutional right to birth
control, but in a new way, by framing the issue of reproductive freedom as
no property interest in the land).
41. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141-42 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).
42. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165-66 (1878).
43. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942).
44. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding that the fundamental theory
of liberty "excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept
instruction from public teachers only").
45. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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a sub-species of marital privacy. "Would we allow the police to search the
sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of
contraceptives?" Justice Douglas asked. "The very idea is repulsive to the
notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship." '46 The Griswold
opinion contains one of the Court's most famous pronouncements on
marriage, and one that once again reveals the limitations of law in
explaining the social purpose of marriage:
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully
enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an
association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in
living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or
social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any
involved in our prior decisions.47
This excerpt from the Griswold opinion devotes much description to what
marriage does, but not much to what it is (perhaps because marriage is
what marriage does?). It acknowledges that marriage is "as noble" as
procreation, even in a marriage where the partners choose not to procreate.
In cases that explicitly addressed the question of the right to marry, a
closer link between marriage and procreation became clear. Marriage, as
the only institution where sex was legally permitted, was also the
institution in which procreation was allowable, for, at least then,
procreation ineluctably followed sex. To deny marriage to an individual,
then, was to deny him or her the opportunity for sex and children-
perhaps even the "pursuit of happiness" as implied by the Meyer court or a
"noble purpose" as explained in Griswold. In Loving v. Virginia, the case
that overturned Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute, the freedom to
marry was once again linked to "the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men."48 Next, the opinion taught that "Marriage is one of the 'basic civil
rights of man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival" (citing
Skinner, the sterilization case).49 Once again, there may be an implicit link
here between marriage and procreation, the implication being that
procreation (and sex?) cannot occur (or cannot occur in an "orderly"
way?) without marriage. Marriage is doing a lot of work in Loving,
working to make sex and procreation legitimate. Even in McLaughlin v.
Florida, the Supreme Court case striking down cross-racial extra-marital
sex that came down two years before Loving, the Court conceded that
fornication and adultery laws are necessary "to prevent breaches of the
basic concepts of sexual decency; and we see no reason to quarrel with the
State's characterization of this statute, dealing as it does with illicit
46. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
47. Id. at 485-86.
48. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I, 12 (1966).
49. Id.
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extramarital and premarital promiscuity."5 The purpose here was not to
provide stable homes for children but to police all sexual activity,
procreative or not.
This link between marriage, procreation, and sex was made more
explicit in the landmark case of Zablocki v. Redhail, which concerned a
constitutional challenge to a Wisconsin law that denied marriage licenses
to parents who were in arrears on their child support payments.5" Justice
Marshall's opinion reveals ambivalence about the connection between
marriage and procreation. On one hand, the Court's opinion was skeptical
that a serious link existed. One of Wisconsin's purported state interests in
defending the law was that it would prevent "dead-beat dads" who refused
to pay for previously fathered children from continuing to "incur new
obligations"-presumably marital obligations to the new spouse, as well
as additional children born into the new marriage. The statute, the Court
held, was "grossly underinclusive" in meeting this goal, for new support
obligations to new children could develop regardless of whether a father
remarried or not.53 (In fact, Mr. Redhail's girlfriend was pregnant with his
child when they initially sought a marriage license.)
Despite this delinking of marriage and procreation in its analysis of the
state's interest, Justice Marshall's opinion re-linked marriage and
procreation in its holding concerning the source of the right to marry.
Zablocki turned not only to Skinner, Pierce, Meyer, and Loving for the
proposition that marriage, like procreation, was a fundamental right, but
also made a new move by incorporating the marital privacy right from
Griswold. Why should the protection of marital privacy (protection from
outside intervention in an already-existing marriage) serve as a basis for a
right to enter the institution of marriage? Because, according to Justice
Marshall, the institution of marriage is the legal space in which one can
exercise one's familial privacy rights:
It is not surprising that the decision to marry has been placed on the
same level of importance as decisions relating to procreation,
childbirth, child rearing, and family relationships. As the facts of this
case illustrate, it would make little sense to recognize a right of
privacy with respect to other matters of family life and not with
respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation
of the family in our society. The woman whom [Redhail] desired to
marry had a fundamental right to seek an abortion of their expected
child ... or to bring the child into life to suffer the myriad social, if
50. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 193 (1964).
51. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 379 (1978).
52. Id. at 390.
53. Id. ("although it is true that the applicant will incur support obligations to any children born
during the contemplated marriage, preventing the marriage may only result in the children being born
out of wedlock... Since the support obligation is the same whether the child is born in or out of
wedlock, the net result of preventing the marriage is simply more illegitimate children.")
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not economic, disabilities that the status of illegitimacy brings...
Surely, a decision to marry and raise the child in a traditional family
setting must receive equivalent protection. And, if appellee's right to
procreate means anything at all, it must imply some right to enter the
only relationship in which the State of Wisconsin allows sexual
relations legally to take place.54
Marriage, then, is the legal institution whereby individuals exercise their
right to procreate and their right to engage in sexual relations. And the
Court recognized not only the legal but the social importance of marriage:
even if illegitimacy caused no legal harm to Redhail's child, the social
harm caused by the child's birth outside of wedlock was enough to protect
Redhail's right to marry.
After Zablocki, court-watchers might have assumed that the right to
marry was dependent on laws making extra-marital sex illegal. But this
idea was challenged in Turner v. Safley, where the Court examined the
right of female prisoners to marry. A prison regulation allowed inmates to
marry only with the permission of the superintendent of the prison, and
provided that permission should be given only when there were
"compelling" reasons to do so.55 Prison officials testified at trial that only
a "pregnancy or the birth of an illegitimate child" would be considered
"compelling."56 The Court, while emphasizing courts are "ill equipped" to
deal with "complex and intractable" problems of prison management,
nevertheless struck down the regulation as a violation of the inmates'
constitutional right to marry. 57 Even in the prison context, where an
individual's constitutional rights may be abridged in the interest of
penological objectives, "many important attributes of marriage remain."
These attributes included, according to Justice O'Connor's opinion, many
attributes that are not explicitly tied to sex or procreation, including
"expressions of emotional support and public commitment... [and]
spiritual significance."58 In fact, the opinion explicitly separates marriage
from sex, at least sex in the here-and-now, noting that "most inmates
eventually will be released by parole or commutation, and therefore most
inmate marriages are formed in the expectation that they ultimately will be
fully consummated."59 Even if, in other words, a prison can legitimately
deny an inmate the right to have sex with her romantic partner for
penological reasons, it cannot likewise deny her the right to marry that
partner. Marriage means something above and beyond the exercise of
sexual and reproductive rights. In fact, one aspect of the rule that may
54. Id. at 386 (citations omitted).
55. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 82 (1987).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 84, 99-100.
58. Id. at 96.
59. Id.
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have been especially troubling to the Court was that exceptions to the "no
marriage" rule were made only in cases of pregnancy or childbirth.60
This view-that Constitutional privacy has more to do with sexual
autonomy than actual procreative rights-is supported by Lawrence v.
Texas. Lawrence can be read as the nail in the coffin of Zablocki, for it
breaks down the distinction between married, illicit sex, and the other, less
savory kinds. By declaring bans on homosexual sodomy unconstitutional,
Lawrence challenges the idea that marriage can be a proxy for legal sex,
and strengthens the notion that constitutional privacy rights concern not
the relationship of marriage but instead the sexual autonomy to enter into
many kinds of relationships.6 Lawrence (as well as the abortion cases,
Roe and Casey) gives us a window on a world in which marriage has been
replaced by sex as the organizing category when we speak of sexual and
reproductive privacy rights.6" We used to protect marriage because it was
the legal place for sex and reproduction. Now we protect sexual
autonomy, and do not punish people for their reproductive choices by
conscripting them into procreation. 63
After Lawrence, we are left with two competing and perhaps
irreconcilable views about marriage and procreation. Lawrence and
Turner would de-link marriage from sex and procreation, focusing instead
on the protection of relationships. Zablocki would give protection to
marriage in order to facilitate legal sex and procreation. But note that in
neither of these views is accidental procreation the primary reason for
marriage. In Turner, any necessary link to procreation is specifically
abjured; in Zablocki the difference is more subtle. Zablocki identifies
marriage as a civil right because procreation is a civil right and marriage is
facilitative of procreation; the accidental procreation rationale rather seeks
to deny marriage to some in order to protect the state's ability to chasten
and discipline others.
60. Id. at 82.
61. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (holding that "[w]hen sexuality finds overt
expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal
bond that is more enduring . . . [t]he liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons
the right to make this choice").
62. Cf Ariela R. Dubler, Immoral Purposes: Marriage and the Genus of Illicit Sex, 115 YALE L.
J. 756, 763 (2006) (arguing that marriage historically was the "sine qua non of licit sex and
nonmarriage necessarily marked sex as illicit" and that "Lawrence turns that construct on its head by
linking the licit nature of same-sex sex to its location outside of legal marriage").
63. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 (homosexuals have a right to autonomy just as heterosexuals
have); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (state may not intervene in abortion decision during
first trimester); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (woman has right to choose
abortion before fetal viability without undue interference from the State).
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III. MARRIAGE AND "ACCIDENTAL PROCREATION"
The changing messages sent by the Supreme Court are reflected in early
lower court and state court decisions concerning same-sex partners. These
cases uniformly linked marriage to procreation, either by "perpetuation of
the race" as the purpose of marriage 64 or simply because the United States
Supreme Court had often linked the right to procreate with the right to
marry.65 These cases did not argue that marriage was intended to channel
male sexuality and prevent accidental procreation; the very examples
courts chose, in fact, would have contradicted this claim. Consider Baker
v. Nelson, in which the court stated with no irony: "The institution of
marriage as a union of man and woman, uniquely involving the
procreation and rearing of children within a family, is as old as the book of
Genesis. 66  Sarah's handmaiden Hagar, who gave birth to Abraham's
children because of Sarah's infertility, would be quite surprised to
discover that marriage was the institution designed to police Abraham's
sexual impulses; and the sisters Rachel and Leah, both married to Jacob,
knew that marriage facilitated, rather than constricted, Jacob's access to
multiple sexual partners.67
In the disputes over same-sex marriage, marriage was seen as an
institution designed to encourage procreation, not one intended to ensure
that irresponsible procreators have a legal incentive to procreate
responsibly. Gay people were not only biologically unfit to this task, but,
as Jesse Helms put it, "weak, morally sick wretches."6 8 By the time the
Massachusetts Supreme Court decided the Goodridge case in 2003, the
argument that marriage was necessary for propagation of the species was
beginning to lose traction, perhaps in light of abundant evidence that the
species was continuing to reproduce in adequate numbers, with or without
marriage. Instead of the argument seen in early same-sex marriage
cases-that same-sex partners are incapable of reproducing together, and
therefore fall outside of marriage's ambit altogether-a new argument
emerged. Same-sex couples could have children, and in fact were having
children, whether through sperm donation, egg donation, surrogacy
contracts, adoption, or heterosexual intercourse with friends or former
64. See Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (in denying visa to same-
sex partner of U.S. citizen, court held that "propagation of the race is basic to the concept of marriage
and its legal attributes"); see also Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1195 (Wash. App. 1974) ("The fact
remains that marriage exists as a protected legal institution primarily because of societal values
associated with the propagation of the human race. Further, it is apparent that no same-sex couple
offers the possibility of the birth of children by their union").
65. Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 333 (D.C. 1995) (in denying marriage license to
same-sex couple, court held that "we cannot overlook the fact that the Supreme Court has deemed
marriage a fundamental right substantially because of its relationship to procreation").
66. Bakery. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (1971).
67. Genesis 16, 29-30.
68. Mark Hosenball, Jesse's World, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 5, 1994, at 24.
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partners, and these families sought recognition as such, in part through
marriage. The popular anti-gay response to this new turn of events was to
disparage same-sex couples' ability to parent. 69 The rhetoric of the late
1990s and early 2000s was one that assumed that marriage had something
to do with children. The fight was over whether same-sex parents
deserved to be given the marriage label. If children were really better off
with married parents, an argument on the pro-same-sex marriage side
went, then why not let all parents marry their partners of choice, rather
than leave the children of same-sex couples in legal limbo?
Those against same-sex marriage found themselves caught in a logical
and linguistic bind: marriage, they argued, makes parents better parents,
but gay people should not be allowed to be better parents for the sake
of... children. Of course, anti-gay folks believed that gays were bad
parents, but the facts were at best ambiguous. Studies showing that
children of unmarried couples-straight or gay, but mostly straight-did
worse on a variety of metrics only reinforced that marriage was good thing
for everyone. And studies showing that the children of same-sex couples
in particular had poorer outcomes begged the question of how much the
legal and social refusal to recognize these relationships affected the
parenting environment for these children.7" Indeed, by the time of
Goodridge, even Justice Cordy in articulating the reasons why the state
should limit marriage to heterosexuals conceded that "there is no question
that many same-sex couples are capable of being good parents, and should
be (and are) permitted to do so."'" As the simple knee-jerk response that
"gay people make bad parents" became untenable, a new rationale was
necessary, and "accidental procreation" fit the bill.
The accidental procreation rationale is first fully articulated in Justice
Cordy's Goodridge dissent, where it takes a front seat to arguments about
tradition, morality, and social science data about the efficacy of gay
parenting. Although Cordy appears to find these other arguments
persuasive as well,72 much of his opinion is focused on defining with great
particularity the link, as he sees it, between marriage and procreation:
69. See, e.g., Bottoms v. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d 276, 279-80 (Va. App. 1994) (reversing trial court
decision that denied custody due to lesbian mother's "unfitness" as a parent); T.C.H. v. K.M.H., 784
S.W.2d 281, 283-85 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (finding mother's lesbian relationship harmful to her
children); J.A.D v. F.J.D., 978 S.W.2d 336, 339-40 (Mo. 1998) (holding that mother's homosexual
relationship had a negative impact on children and finding her unfit); Pulliam v. Smith, 501 S.E.2d
898, 904-905 (N.C. 1998) (holding father to be unfit parent for practicing homosexuality with children
in the house).
70. For a summary of the key studies, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN K. HUNTER,
SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW 1182-88 (2d. ed. 2004).
71. Goodridge, 798 N.E. 2d at 1003.
72. See id. at 998.
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Civil marriage is the institutional mechanism by which societies have
sanctioned and recognized particular family structures, and the
institution of marriage has existed as one of the fundamental
organizing principles of civil society ... Paramount among its many
important functions, the institution of marriage has systematically
provided for the regulation of heterosexual behavior, brought order to
the resulting procreation, and ensured a stable family structure in
which children will be reared, educated and socialized ... [A]n
orderly society requires some mechanism for coping with the fact that
sexual intercourse [between a man and a woman] commonly results
in pregnancy and childbirth. The institution of marriage is that
mechanism.73
While acknowledging that marriage has served "many important
functions," Cordy's argument focuses on only one strand in the history of
marriage ideology: the strand emphasizing the potential of marriage to
discipline and regulate heterosexual behavior. Cordy reaches for his
characterization of marriage back to 1810, to the Massachusetts case
Milford v. Worcester, which found that the purpose of marriage is "to
regulate, chasten, and refine, the intercourse between the sexes; and to
multiply, preserve, and improve the species."74 Certainly he is right that
marriage has been one of the ways in which society deals with the
possibility of procreation. But Cordy's gloss on the history of marriage
adds a dark twist: through marriage, society is coping with a potentially
unfortunate fact; sex and the resultant children are seen as an unfortunate
problem in need of taming. Without marriage, Cordy insinuates, men
would refuse to be responsible fathers:
[A]side from an act of heterosexual intercourse nine months prior to
childbirth, there is no process for creating a relationship between a
man and a woman as the parents of a particular child. The institution
of marriages fills this void by formally binding the husband-father to
his wife and child, and imposing on him the responsibilities of
fatherhood. The alternative, a society without the institution of
marriage, in which heterosexual intercourse, procreation, and child
care are largely disconnected processes, would be chaotic.75
Again, the language of discipline: marriage binds, imposes, and makes
otherwise irresponsible men responsible; it is for the benefit of innocent
women and children that it "fills the void" that in a state of nature would
leave them bereft. Or is the "chaos" to which Cordy refers the chaos that
results when property is held primarily or solely by men, to be transferred
to other men, and that property includes women, but there is no means of
73. Id. at 995.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 996.
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transmitting the property intergenerationally? Without a mechanism for
delineating ownership of women and ties to children, consolidation and
control of property would be very difficult indeed. Even though we have
no doubt lost our belief in the improvement of "the species" in marriage,
the capacity of marriage to "regulate" and "chasten" retains a cultural and
legal force.
So the purpose of marriage, or if not the purpose, one of the functions it
serves for Cordy, is the channeling of male sexuality into domesticity. But
why shouldn't homosexuality also be so channeled? The answer for
Cordy is that marriage is a message directed at the potentially
irresponsible heterosexual procreator:
As long as marriage is limited to opposite-sex couples who can at
least theoretically procreate, society is able to communicate a
consistent message to its citizens that marriage is a (normatively)
necessary part of their procreative endeavor; that if they are to
procreate, then society has endorsed the institution of marriage as the
environment for it and for the subsequent rearing of their children;
and that benefits are available explicitly to create a supportive and
conducive atmosphere for those purposes. If society proceeds
similarly to recognize marriages between same-sex couples who
cannot procreate, it could be perceived as an abandonment of this
claim, and might result in the mistaken view that civil marriage has
little to do with procreation: just as the potential of procreation would
not be necessary for a marriage to be valid, marriage would not be
necessary for optimal procreation and child rearing to occur.7 6
In other words, including same-sex couples in marriage would dilute the
message that the purpose of marriage is the channeling of heterosexual
procreative urges.
Justice Cordy's dissent proved to have remarkable traction. After
Goodridge, every state appellate court hearing a same-sex marriage case
upheld, contra to Goodridge, their state's ban on same-sex marriage, until
the California Supreme Court reversed this trend in The Marriage Cases.
The majority and concurring opinions in these cases tracked Cordy's
accidental procreation argument, sometimes even quoting his dissent by
the paragraph. Some even went a step or two further in branding the
regulation of accidental procreation as the sine qua non of marriage,
translating Cordy's skeptical neutrality regarding the parenting ability of
same-sex couples into a back-handed compliment of innate superiority. It
seems that attacking the abilities of gay people to parent is no longer in
vogue, at least among the judicial set; instead, courts try to distinguish
between the accidental procreation argument and the previous "only
straights can do it" argument and "straights are better parents" argument.
76. Id. at 1002.
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Court after court insists that one does not have to be "bigoted" in order to
oppose same-sex marriage; that "homosexual parents understandably
decry" the idea that the heterosexual couple is the optimal partnership for
raising children, and that voters and legislators were not motivated by
"anti-gay sentiment" in passing same-sex marriage bans." Instead, these
courts point to the accidental procreation argument as the "real" reason for
the legislation. In Indiana in 2005, for example, the Court of Appeals
claimed that same-sex couples were by definition more prepared parents
than most heterosexuals:
[There is a] key difference between how most opposite-sex couples
become parents, through sexual intercourse, and how all same-sex
couples must become parents, through adoption or assisted
reproduction. Becoming a parent by using "artificial" reproduction
methods is frequently costly and time-consuming. Adopting children
is much the same. Those persons wanting to have children by
assisted reproduction or adoption are, by necessity, heavily invested,
financially and emotionally, in those processes. Those processes also
require a great deal of foresight and planning. "Natural" procreation,
on the other hand, may occur only between opposite-sex couples and
with no foresight or planning. All that is required is one instance of
sexual intercourse with a man for a woman to become pregnant.78
In essence, same-sex couples are better parents-more stable, more
thoughtful, and wealthier-than opposite-sex couples (at least the fertile
ones). Furthermore, they are incapable of engaging in the dangerous
activity of heterosexual intercourse that could result in an unexpected
pregnancy. Thus, they do not need chastening effects of the institution of
marriage. It is this insight that led Kenji Yoshino, after the publication of
the New York Court of Appeals decision in Hernandez v. Robles, to the
conclusion that the accidental procreation argument sees same-sex couples
as "too good for marriage."79
In making the argument that the purpose of marriage is to prevent
heterosexual couples from the negative effects of accidental procreation,
the Indiana court engaged in a remarkable act of re-narrating the origins of
marriage. After listing the difficult and expensive decisions a same-sex
couple must engage in to reproduce, it provided an explanation of how and
why heterosexual marriage might have come about. The State, it
explained, may "legitimately create the institution of opposite-sex
marriage, and all the benefits accruing to it, in order to encourage male-
77. Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455 F. 3d 859, 867 (91, Cir. 2006) (emphasis added);
see also Andersen, 138 P.3d at 981 (insisting that Washington state legislators "were not motivated by
antigay sentiment in 1998 but instead were convinced for other reasons that marriage should not be
extended to same-sex couples").
78. Morrison, 821 N.E. 2d at 24.
79. Kenji Yoshino, Too Good for Marriage? N.Y.TIMES, July 14, 2006 at A]9.
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female couples to procreate within the legitimacy and stability of a state-
sanctioned relationship and to discourage unplanned, out-of-wedlock
births resulting from 'casual' intercourse."" ° Excluding same-sex couples
from marriage did not result from discrimination. Nor did marriage result
from the gradual imposition of law onto a non-legal institution with
origins in the primordial ooze. Rather, marriage developed as a way to
make heterosexual couples better-to encourage heterosexual men in
particular to enter into a legal relationship that would bind them to their
future children. Given the tortured and ancient history of marriage in both
law and culture, the idea that the modem state "created" the institution of
marriage to serve a singular, particular purpose seems far-fetched. In
another recent same-sex marriage case, the New York Court of Appeals
similarly took the accidental procreation rationale out of Cordy's mouth
and left everything else behind, claiming that "marriage was instituted to
address the fact that sexual contact between a man and a woman naturally
can result in pregnancy and childbirth."8 1
In developing the "accidental procreation" argument, the Indiana court
explicitly distinguished between this argument and its predecessor, the
"natural is better" argument. It is not that procreation through natural
intercourse is better than assisted procreation, the court explained, but
instead that we need an institution that will encourage "the only type of
couples that can reproduce on their own by engaging in sex with little or
no contemplation of the consequences that might result, i.e. a child, to
procreate responsibly."8 2 In distinguishing these two arguments, the court
insulated itself from accusations that it was discriminating against same-
sex couples, or that it ignored studies indicating that same-sex couples are
"at least as successful at raising children as opposite-sex couples."
83
Instead, these studies became "irrelevant," because the State's real
purpose in limiting marriage to heterosexual couples was to direct their
"biological drives" into "channels of socially accepted activity."84
This argument is all the more extraordinary given the drumming that
homosexual people, and gay men in particular, have taken historically
over their imagined irresponsibility and promiscuity. In the accidental
procreationist view, gay people are simply incapable of making rash or
foolish decisions, at least when it comes to having kids. Although the
Indiana court does in a footnote acknowledge that a lesbian couple could
enlist the aid of a sperm donor rather cheaply should they desire to
reproduce (it never seems to dawn on the court, or any of these courts for
that matter, that one partner in a lesbian couple might actually become
80. Morrison, 821 N.E. 2d at 24.
81. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 21.
82. Morrison, 821 N.E. 2d at 25.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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pregnant through sex with a man!),85 the prototypical procreational
decision envisioned by the court is quite labored and expensive. The
Indiana court even goes so far as to note that the average cost of in-vitro
fertilization is $12,400. Which leads one to wonder, if the average cost of
a wedding in the United States is over $25,000, and many couples-to-be
(or brides?) spend innumerable hours planning their weddings, why do we
still have divorce? 86  Perhaps the couples with the big, expensive
weddings are so much more stable than those who go to City Hall that
they don't need marriage, either.
At the heart of the argument is a paradox: gay couples are seen as
hyper-responsible, and yet what they are doing is disturbingly unnatural.
On one hand, same-sex couples are seen as purposefully going about the
process of conception or adoption, often at great personal expense. On the
other hand, they are seen as stealing from a child his or her birthright
entitlement to biological parentage. (Or, as the dissenting opinion by
Justice Corrigan in The Marriage Cases puts it, "What is unique about this
case is that plaintiffs seek both to join the institution of marriage and at the
same time to alter its definition"). 87 It is all well and good, Justice Cordy
explains, that we allow same-sex couples to adopt children, because in
those cases, "society has 'lost' the optimal setting in which to raise that
child-it is simply not available."88  For Cordy and others, there was a
moment in time-presumably when egg met sperm-when parentage was
"set" and any deviation from this set of parents is a "loss," even if the
people who intended to act as that child's parents bore no relationship to
the people who provided egg and sperm. Same-sex couples may receive
the back-handed compliment of being more responsible than the rest of
society, but they are always a second-best option.
In presenting the accidental procreation argument, courts can appear
unbiased toward same-sex couples; judges can sleep at night knowing that
they haven't really denied same-sex couples anything they didn't already
have. But the accidental procreation argument isn't so benign. Its origins,
which appear to be not in the primordial time when "the state" first
invented marriage but instead in the minds of a few conservative law
professors and fellows of think tanks in the late 1990s, are as one piece of
85. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of about 2 million parents who are gay are raising children
from earlier heterosexual marriages. Caryle Murphy, Gay Parents Find More Acceptance, WASH.
POST, June 14, 1999, at Al; see also Kate Kendell, Lesbian and Gay Parents in Child Custody and
Visitation Disputes, ABA SECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES HUMAN RIGHTS
MAGAZINE, 2003, available at http://www.abanet.org/irr/hr/summer03/custody.html (last accessed
November 25, 2008).
86. See "Ask Carley" on TheKnot.com, who claims that the average wedding costs $27,800.
http://www.theknot.com/ch-qaarticle.html?Object-A1980914200822&keywordlD=l 56&keywordTyp
e=2&parentlD=527.
87. Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 402.
88. Goodridge, 798 NE. 2d at 1000.
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an ideological, explicitly Christian, view of marriage that goes far beyond
limiting marriage to same-sex couples but also espouses traditional gender
roles, bans birth control, and limits divorce.
The first articulation of anything approaching Justice Cordy's accidental
procreation argument in the legal literature occurred in a 2001 law review
article authored by Lynn Wardle of Brigham Young University Law
School entitled Multiply and Replenish. Wardle's article--which is cited
in nearly every court decision rejecting the right to same-sex marriage-
used a new phrase to describe the state's interest in marriage: "responsible
procreation."89 But responsible procreation was not limited to preventing
accidental procreation; it also encompassed the need for more procreation,
and included language of "complementarity"-the idea that men and
women inhabit very different roles as parents, that these roles are each
necessary and complementary to each other, and that the roles should not
be blurred.9° Another proponent of this view, Daniel Cere, gives the
insistence on traditional sex roles a softer edge: marriage's twin purposes
are to "attempt to bridge sex differences" and to "struggle with the
generative power of opposite-sex unions"-that these differences are
"natural" and beneficial is never questioned.91 Indeed, this is the view of
the current Roman Catholic Church, which in 2004 declared that
"[s]exuality characterizes man and woman not only on the physical level,
but also on the psychological and spiritual, making its mark on each of
their expressions," going on to say that only through sex difference can
"spousal love" be experienced.92  The creators of the accidental
procreation argument do not view the prevention of accidental procreation
as the only purpose of marriage, but part and parcel of a particular view of
society that is heavily gendered.
For the accidental procreationists, marriage is just as much about
enforcing a patriarchal role for fathers as it is about preventing their
abandonment of mothers; responsible procreation is all about masculine
control of the family. Or, as one article puts it, a desirable "culture of
marriage" must encourage not only "the birth and rearing of children" and
"bonding between men and children" but also a "healthy form of
masculine identity," a trait that is at risk now that women have "entered
the public realm" and men are no longer given the role of "provider and
89. Lynn D. Wardle, Multiply and Replinish: Considering Same-Sex Marriage in Light of State
Interests in Marital Procreation, 24 Harv. J. of Law & Pub. Pol'y 771, 781 (2001).
90. Id. at 793-94, 802.
91. DANIEL CERE, THE FUTURE OF FAMILY LAW: LAW AND THE MARRIAGE CRISIS IN NORTH
AMERICA 8 (2005).
92. Joseph Card. Ratzinger [now Pope Benedict XVI] & Angelo Amato, "Letter To The Bishops
Of The Catholic Church On The Collaboration Of Men And Women In The Church And In The
World," available at http://www.vatican.va/roman-curia/congregations/cfaith/
documents/rc con cfaith doc_2004073 1_collaboration-en.html (last accessed November 24, 2008).
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protector."93 Other sources quoted by the opinions in these cases shed
further light on the place of the accidental procreation argument alongside
other, now less popular ones. According to Monte Neil Stewart, quoted in
the Morrison v. Sadler decision, the "central and probably preeminent
purpose of the civil institution of marriage (its deep logic) is to regulate
the consequences of man/woman intercourse, that is, to assure to the
greatest extent practically possible adequate private welfare at child-birth
and thereafter."94  Marriage wasn't invented just to encourage co-
parenting, it was invented to make men pay so the state won't have to. If
the issue were simply earning capacity, one would think that two gay
parents would be better than one. But if men and women are
fundamentally different, if men are bread-winning, protective, disciplinary
fathers and women are nurturing, warm, stay-at-home mothers, then
marriage becomes the scaffolding giving social credence to the male role.
The judges who adhere to the "marriage-as-reproductive-good-
housekeeping" argument do not always admit to subscribing to a belief in
the importance of gender difference, an opposition to contraception or
abortion, or a belief in abstinence before marriage. But the accidental
procreation argument makes little sense without these other pieces in
place. If a person genuinely believes that it is possible to prevent pre- or
extra-marital sex, that sex within marriage should be exclusively
procreative, and that men and women perform very different parenting
functions and that these functions should be encouraged by law, then the
accidental procreation rationale makes a lot of sense: sex outside of
marriage would be dangerous indeed. But our suspicion is that many of
the judges who invoke the accidental procreation argument would be quite
uncomfortable with it if they believed it required them to endorse the rest
of the package, as would many citizens affected by judicial
pronouncements about marriage. And even if they do mean it, we might
question whether this vision of marriage is up to the task of dealing with
modem life, where because of prolonged education, people are often in
their late 20's or early 30's by the time they feel financially responsible
enough to take on a parental role. Are these people really going to abstain
from sex until marriage? The evidence would suggest that they are not.
In their recent study, Red Families, Blue Families, Naomi Cahn and
June Carbone argue that two very different visions of the family exist in
different parts of America: that many people in so-called "red states,"
especially Evangelical Christians, adhere to an ideal in which people
abstain from sex before marriage, eschew abortion, and marry at an early
93. Katherine K. Young & Paul Nathanson, The Future of an Experiment, in DIVORCING
MARRIAGE: UNVEILING THE DANGERS IN CANADA'S NEW SOCIAL EXPERIMENT 47-48 (Daniel Cere &
Douglas Farrow ed., 2004).
94. Monte Neil Stewart, Judicial Redefinition of Marriage, 21 CAN. J. FAM. L. 13, 132 (2004).
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age (often because of their desire to experience sex or because of an
unplanned pregnancy). Many people in so-called "blue states" have a
different normative vision of the ideal family: sex is fine before marriage
as long as it's done responsibly, but children should be planned for, and
both marriage and children postponed until a person has achieved financial
and emotional maturity. Either approach to the family has its own internal
logic, but, Carbone and Cahn warn, the "red-state" approach to family has
an important inconsistency: "while blue families have prospered, red
families are in crisis on their own terms-red states have the nation's
highest teen pregnancy and divorce rates, and the growing separation
between the beginning of sexual activity and marriages makes abstinence
increasingly untenable."95 The accidental procreation argument may not
only be inseparable from other arguments about the family that are
unappealing to many people, but this set of arguments may itself be such a
relic of the past that it no longer works even for those who subscribe to it.
IV. MARRIAGE AS A MESSAGE
The rhetoric of accidental procreation, and more particularly, the claim
that it creates a "rational basis" for the legislature to outlaw same-sex
marriage, cannot help but be driven back to a portrait of marriage that is
wholly unappealing for many people. It sets terms for itself that preclude
any discussion of the recent evolution of marital (and non-marital) sex,
child-bearing, and child-rearing. It seems like a kind of last-stand
argument for an unattractive institution that, like police and prisons, can't
be done without. It makes one wonder if this particular defense of
marriage won't turn out to be the final death knell of the institution.
Yet of course the issue addressed in these cases arises because (some)
same-sex couples have decided the married condition is an enviable one,
and indeed that granting all the rights, privileges, and responsibilities of
marriage through "civil unions" doesn't quite fill the bill. Marriage, they
claim, is not just a contract but a status, and one that they should not be
excluded from. Justice Barry T. Albin of the Supreme Court of New
Jersey wrote for the majority in Lewis v. Harris (granting same-sex civil
unions, but leaving it to the legislature to decide if these should be called
marriages): "Raised here is the perplexing question, 'What's in a
name?'-and is a name itself of constitutional magnitude after the State is
required to provide full statutory rights and benefits to same-sex
couples?"96 What's in a name? Evidently, everything and nothing. The
debate is reminiscent of the theological controversies that led to schisms
and crusades and purges, such as the filioque controversy, the principal
95. Naomi Cahn & June Carbone, Red Families v. Bhle Families, abstract available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1008544.
96. Lewis v. Harris, 188 N.J. 415, 458 (2005).
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cause of the schism between the Roman Catholic and Greek Orthodox
churches.97 But here, the everything and the nothing are indistinguishable.
Marriage may hold its mystical estate and its mirage-like desirability to
those excluded from its bonds because it is nothing in itself. Its mysterium
and hence its symbolic desirability directly depends on its surfeit of
meaning; marriage is a floating signifier with no clear referent. This does
not mean that the reality of couplings and couples is not factual enough, or
that in the lived experience of multitudes marriage isn't a central
experience of life, for better or for worse. It probably does mean, though,
that judicial rhetoric will never be able to come to terms with marriage in
any convincing way. It could be that the extra provided by the title
marriage, rather than civil union, its mysterium, is a kind of sacredness
associated with religious marriage-in which case one should evoke the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to say that the state has no
business sponsoring and regulating marriage at all. Let the state provide
civil unions, and let those who want the "extra" consecrate their unions
through the addition of a church wedding-the practice in France, for
instance, since the Revolution.98
Toward the end of his Goodridge dissent, Justice Cordy asserts that by
limiting marriage to "opposite-sex couples who can at least theoretically
procreate, society is able to communicate a consistent message to its
citizens that marriage is a (normatively) necessary part of their procreative
endeavor."9 9 Allowing same-sex couples to marry would communicate a
different message: "[Recognition of] marriages between same-sex couples
who cannot procreate.., could be perceived as an abandonment of this
claim, and might result in the mistaken view that civil marriage has little
to do with procreation."'100 It is not only same-sex couples who see
marriage as a message, but those espousing the rhetoric of accidental
procreation as well. For some same-sex couples, using the name
"marriage" is part of the politics of recognition; for Cordy and others, the
name marriage sends a message of the normative desirability of a
particular attitude to sex and reproduction.'O° For whom is this latter
97. "Filioque" is a Latin phrase meaning "and from the Son" that was added to the Nicene Creed
to clarify that the Holy Spirit proceeds from both Father and Son and not just the Father. See entry for
"filioque" in THE CATHOLIC ENCYLOPEDIA, available at
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06073a.htm.
98. For some of the more well-known iterations of this conclusion, see MARTHA FINEMAN, THE
AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY (2004) and NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND STRAIGHT
(AND GAY) MARRIAGE (2008).
99. Goodridge, 798 N.E. 2d at 1002.
100. Id.
101. Courtney Cahill has identified a variant on this message, the idea that same-sex marriage is
"counterfeit" because it pretends to be the real thing but is not, and will ultimately devalue the "real
currency." See Courtney Cahill, The Genuine Article: A Subversive Economic Perspective on the
Law's Procreationist View of Marriage, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 393, 420-21 (2007) (compiling
instances of "counterfeit" language by lawmakers and policy advocates).
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message intended, and how is it disseminated? The "irresponsible
procreators" the courts have in mind are clearly heterosexuals of child-
bearing age who engage in procreative sex. We are talking about men
who, absent state intervention, would have unprotected heterosexual
intercourse that would result in children, and who will be unlikely to stick
around to financially support the children and unlikely to remain in
relationships with the children's mothers. We are talking about women
who, absent state intervention, will have unprotected intercourse with men
without first negotiating the terms of the deal should a baby result. And
we are talking about men and women who engage in protected intercourse
with no plan for children, find themselves or their partners "accidentally"
pregnant, and are unwilling to undergo an abortion. The existence of
state-sponsored marriage is supposed to convince each of these
"irresponsible procreators" that the sex they have should occur within
marriage instead of outside it. How does the state do this? It offers a
package of goodies to those who marry that makes marriage more
attractive than non-marriage; in other words, it offers a bribe. The
question is then: is this bribe likely to be attractive enough to send the
message that Cordy and others think it sends to potentially irresponsible
procreators?
Some of the rights and privileges of marriage could indeed be construed
as a bribe. Access to a spouse's social security pension and the tax-free
transfer of property upon a spouse's death, for example, are both clear
benefits of marriage over non-marriage that could be translated into a
dollar figure. Essentially the government might be saying to a particular
couple, "get married, and one of you gets $100,000 that you otherwise
won't get. '"102 But other incidents of marriage are more ambiguous. For
couples with similar incomes, being forced to pay federal taxes as a
married couple is actually a financial loss. For individuals with substantial
income, having the state get involved upon divorce will likely result in a
loss of assets that would not have been incurred if no marriage had
happened. It's far from clear that a potentially irresponsible procreator
contemplating marriage would look at the package of goodies offered by
the state and conclude that marriage is a good idea. (It's also worth asking
whether this libidinous beast would even take the time to think through the
decision before taking part in the activities that might lead to an unplanned
pregnancy--our hunch is no.)
Many of the benefits of marriage actually have very little to do with
bribing the parties into taking part in the institution. Rather, they have to
do with providing long-term stability of either party should they divorce,
102. For an in-depth analysis of the economic benefits of marriage, see Terence Dougherty,
Economic Benefits of Marriage under Federal and Connecticut Law (2005), available at
http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/reportsfEconomicBenefitsCT.pdf.
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and providing long-term stability to their children. In terms of what is
offered by state law, marriage is good for kids not because it keeps their
parents together by bribing them into staying but because it provides the
kids with state intervention if the parents split up in the form of a divorce
and custody hearing, a presumption that children born into the marriage
are the legal children of both spouses, and access to adoption by step-
parents. There is a deep inconsistency between the idea that a state's
interest in marriage is in tricking heterosexuals into staying with each
other and the actual benefits and burdens offered by the institution. One
would think, based on what the state actually offers, that the state's
interest in marriage is in giving thoughtful, responsible procreators (like
the same-sex couples and infertile straight couples caricatured in the
various judicial opinions) the ability to protect their children and their
spouses from their own potentially irresponsible behavior down the line.
Even if Justice Cordy is right, and the message sent by the state in
limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples is that marriage is the institution
designed to foster "responsible procreation," how will otherwise flighty
heterosexuals respond? Will they take a hard look at the benefits and
burdens of marriage and decide that marriage is a good deal? Will they
ask themselves whether marriage would make them seem more
respectable? Or will they ask whether marriage will allow them to send a
message to society that they have made a serious commitment to another
person? Many people today marry once they think they have found the
person they want to procreate with, not because they have decided to have
sex for the first time and want to insure themselves against "accidents,"
but because they have been (irresponsibly?) engaging in sex for quite
some time and only now are ready to settle down and have a child. For
these people marriage is certainly a disciplining institution, but not in the
way Justice Cordy imagines. Marriage does not force the accidental
procreator to stick around so much as it encourages an intentional
procreator to make a commitment. Most people decide to marry not
because it will give them access to a gym membership or health insurance
(although certainly some do) but because they think that it is the "right
thing to do" if they want to have children-that it sends signal to the rest
of their community about the seriousness of their relationship. (The norms
of their community therefore matter a lot-if their peers are having
children without marriage, they are unlikely to think marriage is
necessary.) Why do they think it is the "right" thing to do? Not because
of any benefits or burdens the state has doled out, but because of the long-
term social meaning of marriage. The state's reliance on accidental
procreation as a legitimate state interest thus masks the real interest here-
in recognizing some relationships as more worthy than others, and
committed heterosexual relationships as the ones that merit state
involvement. The idea that the state could have an independent interest in
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promoting the prevention of accidental procreation absent a normative,
moral view of marriage is belied by the content of the goods offered by the
state.
We must also consider what the refusal to admit same-sex partners into
marriage says to the potentially irresponsible procreator. Post-Lawrence,
the Supreme Court recognizes a zone of privacy for sexual activity outside
of marriage. We've come a long way since Zablocki in 1978, when
fornication was still illegal. After Lawrence, fornication statutes have
been struck down, even in states with strong stances against same-sex
marriage."0 3 In this legal climate, excluding gay people from marriage
essentially says "go ahead, have sex all you want as long as you aren't
going to reproduce." In an age of birth control, how does this encourage
heterosexuals to confine sex to marriage? Contrast this with the message
that (might) be heard by the irresponsible procreator if same-sex couples
could marry: "the state expects anyone, regardless of sexual orientation,
who is in a sexual relationship to marry." Or perhaps, depending on which
same-sex couples chose to marry-the ones who had kids versus the ones
who didn't-: "the state expects anyone who plans to have children
together or might have children together to marry." We might or might
not be happy about this kind of state intervention in personal relationships,
but if the state's real interest is in creating stable homes for children,
wouldn't the best idea be to harness the energy of same-sex couples who
want to be "respectable" citizens and use them as an example for the less
responsible, more "impulsive" straights?
If historians in fifty years are asking themselves "who killed marriage,"
they might look not to same-sex marriage proponents, who wanted
desperately to be included in an institution that has meant many things to
many people, but to the Justice Cordys of the world, who shrunk marriage
to some essential elements that were not appealing enough to most folks to
hold the institution together. One must wonder, of course, whether courts
really have much power over the public's perception of marriage. (A
multi-billion dollar wedding industry may have much more power than a
few state supreme court justices). After all, Justice Cordy, as well as the
majorities in the Indiana, New York, and other cases, made the accidental
procreation argument in the context of considering whether limiting
marriage to opposite-sex partners was a legitimate state interest for
purposes of rational basis review. This exceedingly forgiving form of
constitutional review allows the court to consider any argument the state
might make to support its law, even if this argument is not the real reason
for the law and even if other, impermissible arguments exist. No trained
lawyer would think that just because some courts say that particular states
103. See Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E. 2d 367 (Va. 2005) (striking down Virginia's fornication
statute as contrary to holding of Lawrence).
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might have created marriage law in order to encourage otherwise
irresponsible heterosexuals to procreate responsibly that this was really
what these states believed. But does the public know this? And even if
lawyers and judges "know" what rational basis review is, don't they also
learn what abstract and evanescent concepts like "marriage" mean through
the reification that occurs when courts make attempts to textually define
the undefinable? Indeed, some of the opinions reach conclusions about
the state interest in marriage that are not qualified by the usual "the
legislature might have thought.. ." language. In her concurrence in the
New York case, for example, Justice Victoria Graffeo states flat-out that
"marriage was instituted to address the fact that sexual contact between a
man and a woman naturally can result in pregnancy and childbirth" before
stating that the Legislature's focus on opposite-sex couples is therefore
"understandable" and "not irrational."' °4 Regardless of what standard of
review is being used, these opinions introduce a new definition of
marriage as if this definition had existed from time immemorial and as if it
so exists today.
Much ink has been spilled poking fun at Justice Kennedy's moments of
seeming fancy in substantive due process decisions, where he claims, for
example, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey and again in Lawrence v. Texas
that "a[t] the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life." '' ° But perhaps Kennedy is onto something. By defining what can't
be defined, and by defining it in a way that will make many people
respond with aversion or alienation, the accidental procreationists may
have begun the process of transforming marriage from an institution that
can be imbued, chameleon-like, with whatever characteristics an
individual feels or needs to use to fill it into a mere regulatory device that
people engage in out of a sense of obligation, duty, or access to health
insurance. Given the choices people now have-indeed, in the era after
Lawrence v. Texas, now that marriage is no longer necessary for a publicly
and legally acceptable sexuality-it remains an open question whether this
rigid and disciplinary view of marriage will have very many takers.
In The Marriage Cases, the California Supreme Court re-reads the
history discussed by Cordy and others in a different way. In Loving v.
Virginia, Chief Justice Warren wrote that "[t]he freedom to marry has long
been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness. 0 6 Justice Cordy's jurisprudence emphasizes the
orderly aspect of the pursuit of happiness, and suggests that orderliness
requires distinct gender roles to send a message to irresponsible
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heterosexuals about the legal and cultural meaning of their reproductive
capacity. In contrast, the California court reads Loving as implying that the
pursuit of happiness includes the freedom to marry the person of your
choice: "None of the past cases discussing the right to marry-and
identifying this right as one of the fundamental elements of personal
autonomy and liberty protected by our Constitution-contains any
suggestion that the constitutional right to marry is possessed only by
individuals who are at risk of producing children accidentally."' 7 This
"new" view of marriage is just as historically unmoored as Cordy's
accidental procreationist view but seems more consonant with the
understanding of people who enter into the status of marriage today. In
particular, the language of "freedom" and "right" and, implicitly, choice in
marriage is precisely what marriage was not according to structural
anthropologists and church historians; L6vi-Strauss, for example, would
say that the purpose of marriage is precisely to limit choices so that people
will marry only outside their clans. But clearly, contemporary American
marriage has come to be seen culturally as a right, a matter of free choice,
and a key element in the pursuit of happiness. The view of marriage as a
guard-rail against irresponsible procreation promoted by Cordy and those
who cite him evokes a very different image, one of marriage as designed
to "regulate" and "chasten" "the intercourse between the sexes," in the
1810 language he finds appropriate to the present moment. This image,
one that is unlikely to resonate with most people, and one that is, indeed,
deeply unappealing for many, is unlikely to influence the behavior of the
"irresponsible procreator." Upon marrying following the Massachusetts
Supreme Court ruling in Goodridge, one resident was quoted as saying,
"'I feel kind of like my bones filled out somehow ... I felt thin and shaky
this morning, and I feel fortified and amazed."' 8 If the historians are
right, and we no longer think of marriage as alliance-building but instead
consider it as a step on the path to personal self-fulfillment, can the law
alone limit the institution by insisting that it exists to spread a message
about self-denial and channeling of urges? We seriously doubt it.
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